An outline of predictions and projections in climate science through the lens of initial-condition dependence and initial-condition uncertainty. During the discussion of uncertainty, Werndl outlines two types which had not been discussed to much extent in the philosophical community. This new insight leads to many conclusions throughout the entirety of the paper.

A discussion regarding double-counting in climate modeling, arguing that the use-novel intuition largely held in the scientific community, that data used in tuning cannot be used in confirmation, is too crude. Steele and Werndl maintain that the prominent logics of confirmation do not, for varying reasons, support this intuitive position in full.

A discussion of the problem of double-counting in climate modeling, specifically when the same evidence is used to both calibrate a model and then confirm the adequacy of the results. Steele and Werndl turn to a Baysian approach to argue for a method of incremental confirmation, making double-counting unproblematic. For a response to this argument see Mathias Frisch’s 2015 paper “Predictivism and old evidence: a critical look at climate model tuning”.