Containers » Philosophy of Science
References (27)
These references are contained in ‘Philosophy of Science’.
Against “Possibilist” Interpretations of Climate Models. Philosophy of Science. 2023
Communication of uncertainties, Probability & possibility, Reliability & uncertainty
Varieties of Data-Centric Science: Regional Climate Modeling and Model Organism Research. Philosophy of Science. 2022
Data, Datasets, Machine Learning, Regional climate modelling
Can Machines Learn How Clouds Work? The Epistemic Implications of Machine Learning Methods in Climate Science. Philosophy of Science. 2021
Making Confident Decisions with Model Ensembles. Philosophy of Science. 2021
Climate Models and the Irrelevance of Chaos. Philosophy of Science. 2021
Why Simpler Computer Simulation Models Can Be Epistemically Better for Informing Decisions. Philosophy of Science. 2021
Uncertainties, Values, and Climate Targets. Philosophy of Science. 2020
Political Legitimacy in the Democratic View: The Case of Climate Services. Philosophy of Science. 2020
Local Model-Data Symbiosis in Meteorology and Climate Science. Philosophy of Science. 2020
Model Evaluation: An Adequacy-for-Purpose View. Philosophy of Science. 2020
Holism, or the Erosion of Modularity: A Methodological Challenge for Validation. Philosophy of Science. 2018
Climate Change Assessments: Confidence, Probability, and Decision. Philosophy of Science. 2017
Communication of uncertainties, Decision-making, Reliability & uncertainty
Missing the Forest for the Fish: How Much Does the ‘Hawkmoth Effect’ Threaten the Viability of Climate Projections? Philosophy of Science. 2016
The Diversity of Model Tuning Practices in Climate Science. Philosophy of Science. 2016
Confirmation & evaluation, Confirmational holism
Full textCitesCited byNote
A discussion of what is dubbed the “intuitive position” of calibration and confirmation of climate models. In short, this position states, the tuning of a model directly influences the evaluation of said model, as a result the values used to tune the model cannot be used in the model’s evaluation. Steele and Werndl focus on the diversity of formal calibration methods and how the different perspectives relate to the intuitive position.
Expert Judgment for Climate Change Adaptation. Philosophy of Science. 2016
The Risk of Using Inductive Risk to Challenge the Value-Free Ideal. Philosophy of Science. 2016
Laplace’s Demon and the Adventures of His Apprentices. Philosophy of Science. 2014
The Myopia of Imperfect Climate Models: The Case of UKCP09. Philosophy of Science. 2013
Climate Science Controversies and the Demand for Access to Empirical Data. Philosophy of Science. 2012
The Scientist qua Policy Advisor Makes Value Judgments. Philosophy of Science. 2012
When Climate Models Agree: The Significance of Robust Model Predictions*. Philosophy of Science. 2011
Confirmation & evaluation, Ensemble methods, Robustness, Values
Confirmation and Robustness of Climate Models. Philosophy of Science. 2010
Quantification of Uncertainties of Future Climate Change: Challenges and Applications. Philosophy of Science. 2010
Communication of uncertainties, Decision-making, Reliability & uncertainty
Adaptation to Global Warming: Do Climate Models Tell Us What We Need to Know? Philosophy of Science. 2010
Adaptation, Confirmation & evaluation, Regional climate modelling, Reliability & uncertainty
Comparative Process Tracing and Climate Change Fingerprints. Philosophy of Science. 2010
Whose Probabilities? Predicting Climate Change with Ensembles of Models. Philosophy of Science. 2010
Ensemble methods, Probability & possibility, Reliability & uncertainty