References (7)

These references are contained in ‘The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science’.

1. Saving the Data. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2021 Lusk, Greg

   Data, Datasets, Reanalysis, Understanding & explanation

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2. Initial-Condition Dependence and Initial-Condition Uncertainty in Climate Science. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2019 Werndl, Charlotte

   Hawkmoth effect, Reliability & uncertainty, Theoretical foundations

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   Note

   An outline of predictions and projections in climate science through the lens of initial-condition dependence and initial-condition uncertainty. During the discussion of uncertainty, Werndl outlines two types which had not been discussed to much extent in the philosophical community. This new insight leads to many conclusions throughout the entirety of the paper.

3. Model-Selection Theory: The Need for a More Nuanced Picture of Use-Novelty and Double-Counting. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2018 Steele, Katie, Werndl, Charlotte

   Calibration/tuning, Confirmation & evaluation

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   A discussion regarding double-counting in climate modeling, arguing that the use-novel intuition largely held in the scientific community, that data used in tuning cannot be used in confirmation, is too crude. Steele and Werndl maintain that the prominent logics of confirmation do not, for varying reasons, support this intuitive position in full.

4. Computer Simulation, Measurement, and Data Assimilation. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2017 Parker, Wendy S.

   Data

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5. On Defining Climate and Climate Change. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2016 Werndl, Charlotte

   Climate & climate change, Theoretical foundations

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   Note

   An outline of the ongoing debate regarding how to properly provide a definition of climate and climate change. Werndl first systematizes the debate by providing five desiderata that a proper definition of climate should follow. Ultimately, a number of candidates for a definition are discussed and Werndl argues that a definition focusing on a distribution over time for regimes of varying external conditions is the most promising as it meets all five desiderata.

6. Climate Models, Calibration, and Confirmation. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2013 Steele, Katie, Werndl, Charlotte

   Calibration/tuning, Confirmation & evaluation

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   Note

   A discussion of the problem of double-counting in climate modeling, specifically when the same evidence is used to both calibrate a model and then confirm the adequacy of the results. Steele and Werndl turn to a Baysian approach to argue for a method of incremental confirmation, making double-counting unproblematic. For a response to this argument see Mathias Frisch’s 2015 paper “Predictivism and old evidence: a critical look at climate model tuning”.

7. Hybrid Models, Climate Models, and Inference to the Best Explanation. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2013 Katzav, Joel

   Confirmation & evaluation, Understanding & explanation

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