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Persons » Katie Steele

References (5)

The person ‘Katie Steele’ is mentioned in author or editor position in these references.

  1. Model-Selection Theory: The Need for a More Nuanced Picture of Use-Novelty and Double-Counting. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2018 Steele, Katie, Werndl, Charlotte

    Calibration/tuning, Confirmation & evaluation

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    A discussion regarding double-counting in climate modeling, arguing that the use-novel intuition largely held in the scientific community, that data used in tuning cannot be used in confirmation, is too crude. Steele and Werndl maintain that the prominent logics of confirmation do not, for varying reasons, support this intuitive position in full.

  2. The Diversity of Model Tuning Practices in Climate Science. Philosophy of Science. 2016 Steele, Katie, Werndl, Charlotte

    Confirmation & evaluation, Confirmational holism

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    A discussion of what is dubbed the “intuitive position” of calibration and confirmation of climate models. In short, this position states, the tuning of a model directly influences the evaluation of said model, as a result the values used to tune the model cannot be used in the model’s evaluation. Steele and Werndl focus on the diversity of formal calibration methods and how the different perspectives relate to the intuitive position.

  3. Making Climate Decisions. Philosophy Compass. 2015 Bradley, Richard, Steele, Katie

    Decision-making, Reliability & uncertainty

  4. Climate Models, Calibration, and Confirmation. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2013 Steele, Katie, Werndl, Charlotte

    Calibration/tuning, Confirmation & evaluation

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    A discussion of the problem of double-counting in climate modeling, specifically when the same evidence is used to both calibrate a model and then confirm the adequacy of the results. Steele and Werndl turn to a Baysian approach to argue for a method of incremental confirmation, making double-counting unproblematic. For a response to this argument see Mathias Frisch’s 2015 paper “Predictivism and old evidence: a critical look at climate model tuning”.

  5. The Scientist qua Policy Advisor Makes Value Judgments. Philosophy of Science. 2012 Steele, Katie

    Decision-making, Values