References »
Climate Models: How to Assess Their Reliability. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 2019
Confirmation & evaluation, Confirmational holism, Robustness
Cites (20)
Citations in the corpus, listed by decreasing publication date.
Holism, or the Erosion of Modularity: A Methodological Challenge for Validation. Philosophy of Science. 2018
Building confidence in climate model projections: an analysis of inferences from fit. WIREs Climate Change. 2017
Philosophy of Climate Science Part II: Modelling Climate Change. Philosophy Compass. 2015
Predictivism and old evidence: a critical look at climate model tuning. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. 2015
Calibration/tuning, Confirmation & evaluation, Confirmational holism
Predictivism and old evidence: a critical look at climate model tuning. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. 2015
Model robustness as a confirmatory virtue: The case of climate science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. 2015
A practical philosophy of complex climate modelling. European Journal for Philosophy of Science. 2014
Values and uncertainties in climate prediction, revisited. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A. 2014
Confirmation & evaluation, Reliability & uncertainty, Values
The epistemology of climate models and some of its implications for climate science and the philosophy of science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. 2014
Confirmation & evaluation, Probability & possibility, Reliability & uncertainty
The Myopia of Imperfect Climate Models: The Case of UKCP09. Philosophy of Science. 2013
Severe testing of climate change hypotheses. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. 2013
Climate Models, Calibration, and Confirmation. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2013
Calibration/tuning, Confirmation & evaluation
Full textCitesCited byNote
A discussion of the problem of double-counting in climate modeling, specifically when the same evidence is used to both calibrate a model and then confirm the adequacy of the results. Steele and Werndl turn to a Baysian approach to argue for a method of incremental confirmation, making double-counting unproblematic. For a response to this argument see Mathias Frisch’s 2015 paper “Predictivism and old evidence: a critical look at climate model tuning”.
Hybrid Models, Climate Models, and Inference to the Best Explanation. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2013
Assessing climate model projections: State of the art and philosophical reflections. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. 2012
When Climate Models Agree: The Significance of Robust Model Predictions*. Philosophy of Science. 2011
Confirmation & evaluation, Ensemble methods, Robustness, Values
Confirmation and Robustness of Climate Models. Philosophy of Science. 2010
Holism, entrenchment, and the future of climate model pluralism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. 2010
II—Wendy S. Parker: Confirmation and adequacy-for-Purpose in Climate Modelling. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume. 2009
Should we believe model predictions of future climate change? Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences. 2008
Confidence, uncertainty and decision-support relevance in climate predictions. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences. 2007
Calibration/tuning, Decision-making, Reliability & uncertainty
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Cited by these reference in the corpus, listed by decreasing publication date.